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Brave New World I
We are quite supportive ofthe (Fed's) general
strategy and the way they are going about get-
ting money under control.
----Treasury Undersecretary Beryl Sprinkel,
July 1981
A previous Letter ("Transition," April 17, 1987)
noted that the "Economic Recovery Program" of
the incoming Reagan Administration in 1981
included four principal elements designed to
spur economic growth while at the same time
wind down inflation. These elements included a
cut in tax rates and other tax deductions, a
reduced rate of growth in federal spending, a
reduced "burden" of regulation, and, in the area
of monetary policy, a reduced rate of growth of
the money supply. Budget Director David Stock-
man and Congressman Jack Kemp (R-NY)
described the latter as the "critical Iinchpin" of
the incoming Reagan administration's economic
program, essential not only to restoration of the
Fed's "tattered credibility" but also to the avoid-
ance of an "economic Dunkirk for the GOP."
This Letter reviews the political and economic
environment surrounding the conduct of mone-
tary policy during the early 1980s, particularly
the difficulties created by large federal deficits
and a reversal in Administration support.
Let's pretend
In July 1981, the Vice Chairman of the Con-
gressional Joint Economic Committee UEC),
commenting on the Administration's proposed
tax cuts, asserted that total tax revenues
bolstered by vigorous real (after inflation) growth
in the economy (estimated to average about 4.5
percent a year) would rise by about $250 billion
notwithstanding a prospective loss of about
$500 billion in revenues from tax cuts over the
next four years. This growth, he claimed, would
surpass a $190 billion rise in expenditures and
result in a budget surplus of $7 billion in FY
1985. In the absence of the program, a budget
surplus of $122 billion was projected for FY
1985, but the higher surplus figure was unac-
ceptable to the Administration because it would
have been accompanied by an increase in the
government's share of GNP.
As it turned out, FY 1985 ended with a $212 bil-
lion deficit in spite of some $125 billion in new
funds from various "revenue enhancements"
enacted in 1982-84 to help stem the fiscal fis-
sure. Over the four years, the flow of red ink
swelled to $736 billion, doubling the outstand-
ing federal debt in the process.
Restoring "tattered credibility"
In the face of continuing strong inflation and
expectations of fUfure inflation, stemming in part
from already soaring budget deficits and wide-
spread fears that efforts to control the money
supply (and inflation) would be abandoned, the
Fed reduced its targets for growth of the mone-
tary aggregates in 1981. Both bank reserves and
M1 grew at a significantly slower rate (the latter
by 2.5 percent adjusted for shifts from non-M1
sources into NOW accounts, which were autho-
rized nationwide in 1980, and 5 percent, includ-
ing NOWs), but M2 and M3 exceeded their
1980 growth rates.
Interest rates reached new record highs, includ-
ing a 20V2 percent "prime" and a T-bill rate of
just over 16 percent. Inflation, which started the
year at an 11 percent annual rate, dropped to a
7 percent rate late in the year when real GNP
went into a decline that extended through most
of 1982 - the sharpest decline (3.5 percent) of
the post-World War II years.
The sharp drop in the rate of inflation indicated
to some observers that the Fed's anti-inflation
credibility was being restored, but not everyone
was pleased with the overall results. Assess-
ments of the economy's - and the Fed's - per-
formance varied widely within and among the
House and Senate Banking Committees, the
Congressional Joint Economic Committee UEC),
and the Administration, and led to several
unsuccessfuI attempts at "institutional reforms"
to subject Federal Reserve policies to closer
Congressional supervision.
1982: Intensifying debate
With the economy showing continued weakness
in 1982, including rising unemployment (which
reached 10.6 percent of the labor force) andFR·BSF
high real interest rates resulting in part from a
continuing sharp decline in the rate of inflation
(to under four percent by year-end), the debate
begun in 1981 over monetary and fiscal policies
intensified.
Inhis testimony to the House and Senate Bank-
ing Committees early in the year and again at
mid-year, Chairman Volcker explained that the
Fed's basic objective was to foster an economic
environment conducive to sustained recovery
and "reasonable price stability."He also noted
that the desire of the public to hold assets in rel-
atively liquid form was contributing to a
stronger-than-expected demand formoney and
to a significant decline in its "velocity" or rate of
utilization in spending on production and con-
sumption related activities (a view strongly dis-
puted by the President's Council of Economic
Advisors in their February Economic Report to
the Congress).
Most importantly, Volcker added that attempts
to lower interest rates by excessive money
growth would only re-activate inflationary
expectations. Notingthat the Congress' mid-year
Budget Resolutioncalled for the Federal Reserve
to "re-evaluate its monetary targets in order to
assure that they are fully complementary to a
new and more restrained fiscal policy" (i.e., that
monetary policy be more accommodative), he
expressed the view that "the risks seem ... all
on the side ofastill greater deficit (for FY 1983)
than the Congress and Administration had esti-
mated.
1f Itwas a grimly accurate assessment.
Fiscal year 1982 shortly was to close with a
$120 billion budget deficit - three times that
projected in 1981 by the Administration and by
the Congress in its Budget Resolutions, and FY
1983 was to close with a deficit of $208 bi IIion
- double the projection.
Back to Dunkirk?
For his part, Treasury Secretary Regan in the
spring of 1982 contended that a "restrictive
lf
monetary policywas overwhelming the stimula-
tive efforts ofthe 1981 Kemp-Roth tax cuts, and
ArthurLaffer, a leading "supply-side"advocate,
stated that "monetarism hasn'tworked out and I
don't think it ever will." But Beryl Sprinkel,
Undersecretary of the Treasury for Monetary
Affairs and a leading monetarist, argued in testi-
mony before the JEC that the money supply was
still growing at an "extremely rapid rate" by his-
torical standards, and that if the Fed wereto
raise its "targets
lf for the monetary aggregates, it
would "lose the credibility it has established
over the last year and a half." His assessment
was shared by the majority members of the Sen-
ate Banking Committee, who also endorsed
Sprinkel's view that in the interest of reducing
excessive volatility in the money supply, the Fed
should focus on control of bank reserves or the
monetary base rather than on the broader mone-
tary aggregates (which are determined in part by
demand).
In a dissenting view, most of the minority (Dem-
ocratic) members of the Senate Committee
characterized Fed policy as "excessively tight"
and called for greater attention to the level of
interest rates. However, Senator Proxmire (O-
Wl) again argued that interest rates were being
kept high by fears that the Fed would cave in
under pressure to monetize soaring deficits, and
added that the Fed offered the "only anti-infla-
tion game in town." In June, the Treasury
announced that it had undertaken a study of
possible changes to curb the Fed's
"independence."
In its August Monetary Policy Report, the House
Banking Committee asserted that "very high
short-term rates, especially in real terms, are a
clear sign that monetary policy remains tight by
any standard." It questioned the reliability of the
monetary aggregates as appropriate policy tar-
gets, but also asserted that the Fed's willingness
to exceed its targets in order to attain an "appro-
priate
lf monetary growth "undermined" its cred-
ibility. Most of the minority (Republican)
members strongly disagreed, noting that key
interest rates had fallen by a third over the year,
along with a very sharp decline in the rate of
inflation. They added that "redundant Sense of
the Congress Resolutions (and) conflicting rec-
ommendations of the two Banking Committees
will only make the Federal Reserve's task more
difficult, and sow confusion in the financial
markets.
1f
On balance, each of the monetary aggregates
increased in excess of their targets in 1982 (M1
substantially so, due in part to the introduction
of no-interest-ceiling "Super Nows"; and M2
and M3 slightly so due in part to the introduc-tion of Money Market Deposit Accounts that
also had no interest ceiling). Nevertheless, a
number ofCongressmen and Senators, variously
critical of the Fed for having worked "hand in
glove" with the Administration and for being at
"cross purposes" with the Administration, sub-
mitted several different proposals designed to
achieve a better "coordination" of monetary
and fiscal policies.
In addition to earlier unsuccessful proposals to
impeach the Federal Reserve's Board of Gover-
nors and the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) - the Fed's monetary policy setting
committee, and to repeal the Federal Reserve
Act, several measures proposed to restructure
the Fed by shortening the terms of Governors,
subjecting the System to the appropriations pro-
cess, making the Fed part of the Treasury, and/or
by placing the TreasurySecretary back on the
Board of Governors (a position which he held,
along with the Comptroller, until removed by
the Congress in 1936).
Other proposals, strongly opposed by Senators
Garn (R-UT) and Proxmire, would have man-
dated the Fed to raise its monetary targets to
specified levels, and, in spite of what many
observers believed was a hard "lesson" of the
1970s, to target interest rates rather than the
monetary aggregates.
For example, the "Balanced Monetary Policy
Act of 1982" (co-sponsored by 30 Senators)
mandated the Fed to set yearly targets for posi-
tive real short-term interesnates consistent With
"historical levels" (which levels and which
short-term rates were not specified). A similar
bill sponsored by 60 House Democrats would
have required the Fed to establish targets for
long-term interest rates as well as for the mone-
tary and credit aggregates, and required the
President to express his position on every vote of
the FaMe. A similarly named "Balanced Mone-
tary Policy and Price Stability Act" submitted by
Congressman Kemp directed the Fed, in a com-
plete reversal of Kemp's 1980 position, to aban-
don its concentration on the money supply and
to target lower interest rates with the objective of
moving towards "price stability." In 1982, Kemp
also called for Chairman Volcker's resignation.
None of the bills moved.
In October 1982, Chairman Volcker announced
that the rapid expansion of interest-bearing
accounts was significantly distorting the tradi-
tional relationship ofM1 with interest rates,
income, and spending, and that, partly because
of the effects of the new accounts on "velocity"
(GNP/M1, which had reversed its secular climb
and dropped by almost 5 percent in 1982), less
focus henceforth would be placed on M1 and
more on the broader "aggregates" (M2, etc.). At
the same time, monetary control procedures
would be shifted from a focus on nonborrowed
reserves to one on borrowed reserves in an effort
to reduce the "unsettling" impact on interest
rates of changes in money demand believed to
be related more to portfolio adjustments than to
underlying changes in GNP. Some observers
interpr~ted the move as a reverSion.tode facto
interestratetargeting atthepotential costof
reduced control over the mgneysupply.
In Decernber, a "Sense of the Congress" resolu-
tion passed that called on the Fed to stimulate
an economic recovery. At the insistence of Sena-
tors Garn and Proxmire, it also postulated "due
regard for controlling inflation so as notto...
drive interest rates upward." In fact, in the fall of
1982, the economy had begun a recovery that
would prove to be the longest peacetime expan-
sion on record. As events also were to prove,
monetary a.nd fiscal policies would be the sub-
jects ofcontinuing and -withsome shift in
various Congressional and Administra.tion per-
spectives ---,- frequently heated debate. A future
Letter will discuss developments affecting the
economy and the course ofthe Great Debate
since 1982.
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollaramounts in millions)










Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 204,826 115 973 0.4
Loans and Leases1 6 182,236 - 503 - 2,680 - 1.4
Commercial and Industrial 53,565 - 253 - 102 - 0.1
Real estate 67,770 48 1,390 2.0
Loans to Individuals 37,200 18 - 3,517 - 8.6
Leases 5,413 0 - 232 - 4.1
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 15,282 565 4,210 38.0
OtherSecurities2 7,309 54 - 556 - 7.0
Total Deposits 206,174 - 1,110 3,082 1.5
Demand Deposits 53,537 - 244 3,494 6.9
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 49,119 - 512 14,442 41.6
OtherTransaction Balances4 19,561 - 17 3,651 22.9
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 133,076 - 848 - 4,063 - 2.9
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 44,650 - 462 - 1,203 - 2.6
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000ormore 31,391 - 576 - 5,637 - 15.2
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MonevS 23,245 1,226 - 4,309 - 15.6
Two Week Averages
of Dailv Fi2ures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+}/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading accountsecurities
3 Excludes u.s. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOW and savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percentchange